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The Second World War has had a profound effect on recent history, how we 
understand Europe and what we consider necessary to build stable democratic 
societies. At a juncture in which the most important legacy of that conflict, the 
European Union, is being questioned and where nationalist populism is on the rise, it 
seems particularly important to look back and re-evaluate the global conflict in a new 
light. Indeed, the conflict left no European nation untouched. The Spanish case shows 
how the war had a serious impact not only on the belligerent nations but also neutral 
and non-belligerent ones. This special section aims to explore the dynamics of 
relations between Francoist Spain and Nazi Germany during the Second World War, 
and in doing so contribute to a better understanding of the conflict. The analyses 
brought together in these pages aim to place Francoist Spain in the broader context of 
the global conflict, focusing particularly on the transnational contacts between fascist 
and para-fascist movements,1 Spain’s engagement with the Nazi-fascist European 
project and the role of neutral countries in the midst of total war. Rather than focusing 
excessively on Spain’s potential entry into the Second World War, the different 
contributions look more broadly at Spanish-German relations in this period. Such a 
viewpoint illuminates not only the role Spain had within Nazi foreign policy or the 
inner workings of Francoism and Nazism, but also key themes in the field of European 
history.  
On 23 October 1940, after the fall of France and at the high point of the Falange’s 
dreams of imperial expansion, Francisco Franco and Adolf Hitler met in the French 
town of Hendaye, which lies just over the border from Spain. They met to negotiate 
Spain’s limited participation in the Second World War. However, Franco would end the 
meeting refusing to enter into the war. Some might argue that Germany’s failure to 
take over Gibraltar was one of Hitler’s most costly mistakes, but at the same time 
Franco’s refusal to engage in the project came to be one of his most fortunate 
decisions. The mythification of the Hendaye meeting proved extremely successful. For 
decades after 1945, Franco was presented as a brilliant statesman, a fatherly figure 
who had kept the Axis powers at bay and saved Spain from yet another tragedy. 
By 1943, both the mythification of Hendaye and the rejection of the term 
‘totalitarianism’ (replaced, conveniently, with the concept of ‘organic democracy’) 
presented a new and successful narrative that in the post-war period would present a 
sanitised version of Spain’s role in the Second World War. Francoist Spain entered a 
process of rhetorical de-fascistisation. In this context, marked by the Cold War, former 
diplomats like W.L. Beaulac helped consolidate the myth, characterising Francoist 
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Spain as a ‘silent ally’ of the victorious powers.2 Equally unsurprising is that historians 
close to the regime further supported this thesis, presenting Franco’s Spain as a long-
haul neutral.3 But it was probably Detwiler’s work4 that helped establish the myth 
solidly at the core of a more general historiography, inside and outside of Spain.  
In fact, it was not until the 1980s, once democracy was established in Spain and 
historians had access to new sources, including the publication of Ramón Serrano 
Suñer’s memoirs,5 that the scholarly narrative began to seriously challenge the myth of 
Hendaye. Particularly important in this process was the work of Javier Tusell and 
Genoveva Queipo de Llano, which showed how Spain intended to enter the war after 
the fall of France. A development only prevented by Germany’s lack of insistence, the 
Mediterranean’s marginal importance within Nazi war strategy and Italy’s desire to 
avoid a strong competitor in North Africa.6 Since then, other historians have further 
demonstrated the Francoist regime’s desire to enter the war as a way to restore the 
long-lost empire.7 In this context, Ros Agudo and Norman Goda have showed how 
Spain pursued its own military aims and considered operations against not only 
Gibraltar, but also Morocco, Portugal and even France, none of which necessarily 
involved consultation with the Axis powers.8  
However, none of these works settled the overall debate on when exactly Spain 
shifted its position solidly away from the Axis, if at all. For some, most prominently 
Wingeate Pike, Franco never abandoned his admiration for Nazi Germany. According 
to him, even Jordana, the neutralist minister, presented strong continuities with the 
Germanophile policies of Serrano Suñer.9 However, between roughly 2008 and 2019, 
historians have clearly identified Francoist Spain as a covert ally of the Axis and 
established the waning of this support sometime between January and September of 
1943; a shift marked by the battle of Stalingrad, the fall of fascist Italy and – contrary 
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to Pike’s thesis – Jordana’s neutralist policy.10  
However, Hendaye has continued to cast a long shadow over the study of German–
Spanish relations during the Second World War. This has resulted in a rich 
historiography, but one overtly focused on three main themes: the question of Spain’s 
entry into the war; the Blue Division; and the reasons behind the regime’s survival 
after 1945. This in turn has favoured a proliferation of studies overtly focused on Spain 
without necessarily integrating the country’s history into a broader framework, which 
would allow for a better understanding of the Second World War. However, the new 
consensus, paired with an increasing internationalisation of Spanish historiography, 
has allowed historians to focus on more under-researched topics, even though Spain’s 
potential entry into the war usually remains in the spotlight. In this sense, recent 
studies have drawn attention to a more nuanced evaluation of the Blue Division’s role 
within the Waffen SS,11 a renewed interest in analysing the extent of Spain’s assistance 
to the Axis,12 and a strong development in the field of propaganda and German-
Spanish cultural relations.13 It is the aim of this special section to move firmly away 
from the shadow of Hendaye and, in so doing, advance the field by focusing on three 
less-explored but key areas: transnational fascism; the construction of the New Order; 
and neutrality studies.  
 
The rise of comparative and transnational history has allowed for a much-needed shift 
in fascist studies. The historiographical framework has now broadened and is no longer 
overly concerned with delimiting and defining. The current historiography now both 
acknowledges the pivotal role of Nazi Germany and fascist Italy and considers the 
existence of a post-liberal departure in the inter-war period and its necessary 
analysis. 14  As Constantin Iordachi and Aristotle Kallis have posited, this new 
historiography considers the study of hybrid or fascisticised political movements in 
their own context; it avoids treating them as mere copies of two allegedly perfect 
models: Nazi Germany and fascist Italy.15 In so doing, these new modes of study depart 
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from well-known frameworks, more prominently Paxton’s five stages of fascism and 
the theory of ‘generic fascism’,16 to favour an analysis more focused on contacts, 
influences and the transference of illiberal political ideas between different political 
movements. Whether we talk of para-fascist movements or fascisticised projects,17 it is 
evident that fascism exerted a critical influence over the European political spectrum 
of the 1930s, but one that did not always entail the perfect reproduction of the Italian 
or German models. In this vein, Rodríguez Barreira’s work has already shown the 
importance of looking at these fascist and hybrid movements through a comparative 
lens, allowing for a more nuanced understanding of the dynamics through which they 
related to one another.18 Moreover, if, as Glenda Sluga has argued, the Spanish Civil 
War was one of ‘the most obvious examples of transnational links in the history of 
interwar fascism and anti-fascism’,19 one that produced a regime so closely linked to 
the Nazi-fascist project that it would not break off diplomatic relations with Nazi 
Germany until 1945,20 it seems even more necessary to explore the Spanish case 
within a broader European context, particularly if we want to properly understand the 
post-liberal departure of the 1930s–40s.  
The articles collated in this special section attempt to engage critically with these 
issues, looking at the connections and links established between the Nazi regime and 
Spanish fascists, para-fascists and fellow travellers. In this way, some of our authors 
make important inroads in the underresearched area of party-to-party relations21 by 
focussing on the cooperation and interconnection between the Spanish Falange and 
the Nazi Party. Meanwhile, others focus more generally on how the Nazi project was 
received by contemporary Spanish political and intellectual elites. In this vein, Núñez 
Seixas’ contribution focusses on how Nazi Germany influenced foreign visitors. He 
places these encounters within a much longer period starting in the 1920s and focuses 
on the transnational influences of both Italian fascism and German national socialism 
over Spanish elites. He then shifts attention to the experiences of Blue Division soldiers 
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during the Second World War. His contribution thus provides an overall analysis of 
these contacts, as it considers not just the so-called political pilgrimages of fellow 
fascists to Nazi Germany22 but also of other travellers that came to be influenced by 
the Nazi project in one way or another. As a result, his contribution to this issue 
highlights the complex reception of national socialism by the Spanish right and puts 
Spain’s engagement with the New Order during the Second World War into 
perspective.  
Toni Morant devotes his attention to a very under-explored theme in the 
historiography. The study of fascist and para-fascist women’s organisations has been 
generally overlooked; the analysis of how they worked to shape national and 
international politics has been ignored. It is here where Morant’s work makes its most 
important contribution, not just to the study of transnational fascism but also of 
gender studies. Sección Femenina’s passionate engagement with the New Order 
project adds not just to our understanding of party-to-party relations between fascist 
and para-fascist movements, but of the New Order in general. The activities of these 
women illustrate clearly how Nazi Germany replaced fascist Italy as the preferred 
model in the minds of many among the political elites of Francoist Spain, which in turn 
highlights the period (1941–3) during which the New Order project gained more 
traction. Moreover, as this contribution emphasises, the preeminent place these 
women had in these contacts and exchanges demonstrates not just how the Falange’s 
engagement with the Nazi-fascist project stemmed from a blend of ideological affinity 
and political opportunism, but how the same root allowed these women to make a 
claim to a place in the political space.  
If there is any area in which links and connections between these movements can be 
better explored, then it is the study of the New Order. As Benjamin Martin has 
demonstrated, the Nazi-fascist cultural New Order, while ultimately aimed at achieving 
hegemony in Europe, succeeded in mobilising supporters throughout the continent.23 
This was not just a clear manifestation of the pivotal role these countries played within 
the post-liberal departure from democracy of the interwar period, but also of the 
mobilising power of the Europeanist discourse. As Ute Frevert has argued, Germany’s 
‘love affair with Europe’ in the interwar period had a defensive character that it 
maintained under Nazi rule. While it certainly seems as if the New Order was no more 
than a propaganda through which Nazi Germany sold its war aims to other countries, 
beneath that there also lay a desire to defend the European continent both from the 
United States’ economic hegemony and Soviet Russia’s political project.24 A desire 
shared by many other European countries, which between 1941 and 1943, came to 
see Nazi Germany as the only nation capable of rising to both challenges. In this sense, 
Martin makes a very important point: the New Order sparked genuine interest 
because it seemed to address real issues.25 This is something that comes across clearly 
throughout our special section, showing how, while engagement with the New Order 
was marked by an asymmetrical power dynamic, it did not entail directly copying Nazi-
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fascist ideas and methods. Rather the creation of a milieu in which different political 
movements pursued their own agendas, accepting, in the case of non-belligerent 
nations such as Spain, the Nazi-fascist hegemony insofar as it aided them in achieving 
their own aims and developing their own projects. This becomes particularly clear in 
the case of the Women’s Section of the Falange, studied by Morant, and of the strong 
collaboration between the Falange and the German embassy in terms of propaganda, 
clearly demonstrated in my article. 
However, this engagement with the Nazi-fascist project was not exclusive to the higher 
echelons of the Falange. As Núñez Seixas and David Brydan argue in their respective 
articles, the New Order attracted a much broader range of Europeans for a variety of 
reasons. In this sense, Brydan’s piece on the Blue Division’s health services allow us to 
see the New Order as so many participants at the time must have seen it, as a forum 
for scientific, intellectual and professional exchange. This in turn highlights something 
cultural historians have already noted when evaluating German-Spanish relations in 
the 20th century: how culture progressively became a political and expansionist 
instrument, which served to amplify Germany’s political influence.26 The combination 
of genuine intellectual collaboration and ideological motivations comes across clearly 
in the way the Nazi Party, the Hitler Youth and the Ibero-American Institute worked 
closely with the Spanish health services in Berlin. However, it is also important to note 
how, as both Seixas and Brydan show, these encounters were marked not just by the 
dynamics of European fascism in broad terms but more importantly by a view of 
German efficiency and a civilising mission that had been influencing Spanish elites 
since the 19th century. Moreover, as most of our contributors point out, several of the 
most committed collaborators of Nazi Germany had been Germanophiles during the 
First World War or had spent part of their formative years in Germany.  
As this special section will show, Spanish engagement with the New Order stemmed 
from different motivations. Some, most notably Spanish Falangists and Blue Division 
volunteers, committed to the project because they identified with or admired the Nazi 
ideology. Others engaged with it because they saw their future success – be that in 
imperial, professional or political terms – in Nazi Germany’s military might and 
eventual victory. At the same time, many among the Spanish radical right, not 
necessarily Falangists, projected on Nazi Germany some of their most pressing 
concerns. For them, Hitler became a crusader, the gatekeeper of Christian European 
civilisation, even the avenger of Spain, who would settle the score with the nation’s 
traditional enemies, most prominently Britain. It is, in this sense, particularly 
interesting to see how the same propagandistic arguments exploited by the Nazi 
propaganda apparatus in Spain, as explored in my article, found traction among many 
fellow travellers to Germany, as shown by Núñez Seixas. To what extent this 
phenomenon was a direct result of the strong collaboration between Falange and the 
German embassy in Madrid and what kind of interactions existed between the 
narratives spread by these fellow travellers and the construction of a successful 
propagandistic discourse remain to be explored. In any case, it is evident that Spanish–
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German collaboration was not exclusively rooted in an admiration for the new Nazi-
fascist order, fear or political and strategic opportunism, but in a highly positive and 
lasting image of Germany that stoked Spaniards’ fascination with National Socialism.  
Moreover, while most articles highlight the period spanning 1937 to 1943 as the 
highpoint of Nazi-fascist influence in Spain, they also show how fascination with Nazi 
Germany died slowly, particularly among Falangists. Here, Falangist reticence to let go 
of the idea of the New Order was marked both by an ideological kinship and political 
opportunism, as letting go of the German ally meant acknowledging that the best 
moment for the Falangist project to develop had passed. In this sense, the destiny of 
fascist and parafascist movements came to be almost inextricably linked to the fate of 
the New Order, which in Spain resulted in the Falange’s receding into the background.  
Nonetheless, Spain’s place within the Nazi project was not exclusively determined by 
ideological kinship or the overdue payment of a debt incurred with the Axis powers 
during the Spanish Civil War. While both these factors played a key role in shaping 
Spanish–German relations during the Second World War, my contribution to this 
special section suggests there were other equally important factors to consider. 
Focusing on the study of Nazi propaganda, her work reveals interesting aspects on the 
value of neutrality and the aims of German foreign policy.  
As Maartje Abbenhuis has pointed out, neutrality has been underrepresented in the 
history of the war. Nevertheless, over the last few years, historians such as Wylie, 
Hertog, Kruizinga, Amersfoort, Klinkert and Abbenhuis herself have rescued neutrality 
from oblivion.27 They have not only highlighted the complexity of the concept itself, 
but have encouraged a more nuanced and detailed analysis of neutrality under the 
challenges of total war. It is within this framework that we can place Peñalba-
Sotorrío’s contribution to this special section, in which she shows how Nazi Germany’s 
interest in Spain was not as closely linked to its potential entry into the war as the 
dominant historiography has led us to believe. As the study of propaganda shows, 
German interest in Spain did not wane after the Axis invasion of the Soviet Union in 
1941 and Nazi foreign policy pursued other objectives in Spain than a potential 
operation against Gibraltar. While this reveals the value of non-combatant countries to 
military strategy in the age of total war, Falangist cooperation with the Nazi 
propaganda apparatus, in some cases clearly sanctioned by Franco, shows how, as 
Wylie has already noted, neutrals were not mere pawns in a game they could not 
control. On the contrary, they chose not only to stay out of the war, but how to define 
and conduct their neutrality.28  As Goda has already noted,29 and as our contributors 
make clear, Spain’s policy during the Second World War might not have been 
successful, but it was certainly its own.  
Moreover, my contribution encourages us to explore what German policy in neutral 
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countries can tell us about the overall functioning and decision-making processes 
behind Nazi foreign policy. As Klaus Ruhl’s seminal work has shown, Nazi foreign policy 
in Spain was pursued, albeit in completely opposite directions, by both the German 
embassy and diplomatic corps and by the Nazi party and fellow organisations. 
Moreover, it was in the neutral countries where traditional diplomats had a better 
chance of imposing their own views, which seems to have involved a policy of 
continuities with pre-Nazi policies.30 In this sense, the attempt to transform Spain into 
a bridge to influence Latin America presented strong continuities not only with 
traditional German economic interests but also with specific interwar policies.31 What 
remains to be explored is to what extent these continuities were a reflection of the 
stronger influence of the diplomatic corps over the Nazi party in certain countries and 
how these clashes shaped Nazi foreign policy and, in turn, influenced the development 
of the conflict. Only a full comparative study will be able to answer these questions.  
In the end, despite the extensive body of work we rely on when attempting to broaden 
our understanding of German–Spanish relations during the Second World War, many 
questions remain unanswered. What can connections among fascist and parafascist 
parties tell us about the nature of fascism itself? How can the analysis of the post-
liberal departure illuminate our understanding of populism? What can cross-
continental engagement with the New Order tell us about the idea of Europe and the 
power of the European discourse? Is neutrality really condemned to disappear in the 
modern age, as Nils Ørvik posited?32 How can the analysis of bilateral relations aid our 
understanding of the functioning of the Nazi regime? For as this special section will 
also show, it is within this broader context that we should explore not just German-
Spanish relations, but the whole period of the 1930s–40s, looking not just for breaks 
and novelty in the development of political and cultural relations, but also for 
continuities in terms of diplomatic and cultural policy. 
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